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CVE-2022-4304

CVE.org · Published

Historical CVEsJSONAI instructions

Record status
Published
Identifier year (not publication year)
2022
Source publication
Source updated
Imported by cveboard
Source snapshot
cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline ·

Plain text

CNA source text (English)

Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.

Scoped product and version facts

Fix information unknown; no fixed version is derived here. Missing information does not prove that no fix exists.

Exploitation unknown; this catalogue does not assess exploitation.

OpenSSL

Vendor
OpenSSL
Product
OpenSSL
Platforms
Unknown
Default status
unaffected
OpenSSL · Scoped product and version facts
Version (version)Status (status)Version scheme (versionType)Exclusive end (lessThan)Inclusive end (lessThanOrEqual)Status changes (at → status)
3.0.0affectedsemver3.0.8UnavailableNone listed
1.1.1affectedcustom1.1.1tUnavailableNone listed
1.0.2affectedcustom1.0.2zgUnavailableNone listed