CVE-2022-4304
CVE.org · Published
- Record status
- Published
- Identifier year (not publication year)
- 2022
- Source publication
- Source updated
- Imported by cveboard
- Source snapshot
- cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline ·
CNA source text (English)
Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
Scoped product and version facts
Fix information unknown; no fixed version is derived here. Missing information does not prove that no fix exists.
Exploitation unknown; this catalogue does not assess exploitation.
OpenSSL
- Vendor
- OpenSSL
- Product
- OpenSSL
- Platforms
- Unknown
- Default status
unaffected
| Version (version) | Status (status) | Version scheme (versionType) | Exclusive end (lessThan) | Inclusive end (lessThanOrEqual) | Status changes (at → status) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.0.0 | affected | semver | 3.0.8 | Unavailable | None listed |
| 1.1.1 | affected | custom | 1.1.1t | Unavailable | None listed |
| 1.0.2 | affected | custom | 1.0.2zg | Unavailable | None listed |