{
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "attribution": [
    {
      "source": "CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog",
      "licence": "US government work"
    },
    {
      "source": "GitHub Advisory Database",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "Have I Been Pwned",
      "url": "https://haveibeenpwned.com/",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "CVE Program (CVE records)",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/Legal/TermsOfUse",
      "licence": "CVE Terms of Use",
      "notice": "Copyright © 1999-2026, The MITRE Corporation. CVE is a trademark and the CVE logo is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.",
      "terms": "CVE Usage: MITRE hereby grants you a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE™). Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy."
    },
    {
      "source": "FIRST EPSS",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/epss/",
      "licence": "free to use; FIRST requests attribution"
    }
  ],
  "record": {
    "id": "CVE-2026-102715",
    "sourceURL": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-102715",
    "idYear": 2026,
    "status": "PUBLISHED",
    "publishedAt": "2026-09-29T17:42:35.719Z",
    "updatedAt": "2026-09-29T18:42:21.812Z",
    "importedAt": "2026-10-24T01:57:50.502Z",
    "snapshot": {
      "id": "cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline",
      "at": "2026-10-24T00:00:00.000Z",
      "source": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/releases/tag/cve_2026-10-24_0100Z"
    },
    "facts": {
      "title": "mDNS string-cache lookup matches on slot size, so a peer name aliases a shorter one and the response encoder writes past the packet",
      "summary": "Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its\n\n\n\ntransmit packet.\n\n\n\nThe string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */\n\n\n\nmemory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF;\n\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nlen = *((USHORT*)(p - 2));           /* slot size, not string length */\n\n\n\nif ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,\n\n\n\nso names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered\n\n\n\nwith the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than\n\n\n\nthe length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only\n\n\n\nbound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string.\n\n\n\nTwo PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names\n\n\n\nwhose lengths fall in the same bucket:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nWRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5\n\n    #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode  addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096\n    #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add       addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911\n\n\n0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a\n\n\n\nnormal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible\n\n\n\neffect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.\n\n\n\nCompare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the\n\n\n\nstring length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check\n\n\n\nagree.",
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
          "product": "eclipse-threadx/netxduo",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "0",
              "status": "affected",
              "versionType": "semver",
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}