{ "schemaVersion": 1, "attribution": [ { "source": "CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog", "licence": "US government work" }, { "source": "GitHub Advisory Database", "url": "https://github.com/advisories", "licence": "CC BY 4.0" }, { "source": "Have I Been Pwned", "url": "https://haveibeenpwned.com/", "licence": "CC BY 4.0" }, { "source": "CVE Program (CVE records)", "url": "https://www.cve.org/Legal/TermsOfUse", "licence": "CVE Terms of Use", "notice": "Copyright © 1999-2026, The MITRE Corporation. CVE is a trademark and the CVE logo is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.", "terms": "CVE Usage: MITRE hereby grants you a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE™). Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy." }, { "source": "FIRST EPSS", "url": "https://www.first.org/epss/", "licence": "free to use; FIRST requests attribution" } ], "record": { "id": "CVE-2026-104795", "sourceURL": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104795", "idYear": 2026, "status": "PUBLISHED", "publishedAt": "2026-10-14T10:55:17.144Z", "updatedAt": "2026-10-20T13:02:45.076Z", "importedAt": "2026-10-24T01:57:50.502Z", "snapshot": { "id": "cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline", "at": "2026-10-24T00:00:00.000Z", "source": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/releases/tag/cve_2026-10-24_0100Z" }, "facts": { "title": "Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution", "summary": "The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)\nthat scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a\ncontainer, the coordinator:\n\n1. **fork()s** a child process\n2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces\n3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root\n filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)\n4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving\n the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted\n capability set**\n5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability\n set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**\n6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with\n `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from\n `/proc//cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**\n7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()`\n — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount\n namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**\n\nThe executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with\n`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor\ncontainer's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)\n\n**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers\njoin_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;\nchange_dir(current_dir);\nswitch_user(*process.uid)?;\nif *process.uid != 0 {\n perms::check_no_privileged_perms()\n .expect(\"Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints\");\n}\nfingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);\n```\n\n```rust\n// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0\nfn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {\n debug!(\"... Becoming user: {uid}\");\n seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)\n\n**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`\n\n```go\n// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]\nfunc GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {\n out, err := exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()\n if err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n return string(out), nil\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)\n\n**File:** `version_executable.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint\nreturn Some(vec![\n fpr_kind_executable,\n out_dir.to_string(),\n String::from(&process.command_line[0]),\n String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),\n]);\n```\n\n## Attack Pattern\n\n**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)\n**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet\n**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node\n\n**Attack sequence:**\n\n1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured\n versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,\n or contains `java`)\n2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious\n executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root\n3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the\n attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0\n4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user\n namespace\n5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise", "affected": [ { "vendor": "Red Hat", "product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21", "packageName": "openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9", "collectionURL": "https://catalog.redhat.com/software/containers/", "defaultStatus": "affected", "versions": [ { "version": "1792008935", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "rpm", "lessThan": "*" } ] } ] } } }