CVE-2026-48075

OpenReception's unauthenticated add-to-tunnel endpoint accepts arbitrary appointment injections

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = "CONFIRMED"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue.