{
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "attribution": [
    {
      "source": "CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog",
      "licence": "US government work"
    },
    {
      "source": "GitHub Advisory Database",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "Have I Been Pwned",
      "url": "https://haveibeenpwned.com/",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "CVE Program (CVE records)",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/Legal/TermsOfUse",
      "licence": "CVE Terms of Use",
      "notice": "Copyright © 1999-2026, The MITRE Corporation. CVE is a trademark and the CVE logo is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.",
      "terms": "CVE Usage: MITRE hereby grants you a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE™). Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy."
    },
    {
      "source": "FIRST EPSS",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/epss/",
      "licence": "free to use; FIRST requests attribution"
    }
  ],
  "record": {
    "id": "CVE-2026-48087",
    "sourceURL": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48087",
    "idYear": 2026,
    "status": "PUBLISHED",
    "publishedAt": "2026-08-06T21:32:30.560Z",
    "updatedAt": "2026-08-07T17:08:39.347Z",
    "importedAt": "2026-10-24T01:58:14.884Z",
    "snapshot": {
      "id": "cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline",
      "at": "2026-10-24T00:00:00.000Z",
      "source": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/releases/tag/cve_2026-10-24_0100Z"
    },
    "facts": {
      "title": "OpenReception: WebAuthn passkey injection allows account takeover",
      "summary": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the registration handler at `POST /api/auth/register/{userId}` validates the relationship between the WebAuthn challenge and the registration cookie's email but never validates that the `userId` in the URL belongs to that email. An unauthenticated attacker requests a challenge for their own email, generates a registration response with their own authenticator, and submits it against any victim user's URL. The challenge-vs-cookie email match passes, the WebAuthn ceremony validates, and `addPasskey` writes the attacker's credential into the victim's `user_passkey` rows. The next victim-email login accepts a passkey assertion from the attacker's authenticator and issues a session as the victim. User IDs are not strictly secret on this platform, but the exact set of exposure surfaces should be assessed by the maintainers. Staff-list endpoints return user IDs to authenticated tenant members per the route signature; live verification of all exposure surfaces (whether user IDs leak through any unauthenticated route, through invite-confirmation URLs, or through other administrative views) is part of the pending live PoC. Where the attacker knows the victim's email and userId, the analysis below becomes account takeover. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.",
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "open-reception",
          "product": "appointment-booking-software",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "< 1.0.2",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}