{
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "attribution": [
    {
      "source": "CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog",
      "licence": "US government work"
    },
    {
      "source": "GitHub Advisory Database",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "Have I Been Pwned",
      "url": "https://haveibeenpwned.com/",
      "licence": "CC BY 4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "CVE Program (CVE records)",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/Legal/TermsOfUse",
      "licence": "CVE Terms of Use",
      "notice": "Copyright © 1999-2026, The MITRE Corporation. CVE is a trademark and the CVE logo is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.",
      "terms": "CVE Usage: MITRE hereby grants you a perpetual, worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE™). Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE's copyright designation and this license in any such copy."
    },
    {
      "source": "FIRST EPSS",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/epss/",
      "licence": "free to use; FIRST requests attribution"
    }
  ],
  "record": {
    "id": "CVE-2026-48088",
    "sourceURL": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48088",
    "idYear": 2026,
    "status": "PUBLISHED",
    "publishedAt": "2026-08-06T21:34:32.016Z",
    "updatedAt": "2026-08-08T02:47:46.506Z",
    "importedAt": "2026-10-24T01:58:14.884Z",
    "snapshot": {
      "id": "cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline",
      "at": "2026-10-24T00:00:00.000Z",
      "source": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/releases/tag/cve_2026-10-24_0100Z"
    },
    "facts": {
      "title": "OpenReception vulnerable to unauthenticated staff crypto poisoning that breaks E2E recipient directory",
      "summary": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.4, the route `POST /api/tenants/{tenantId}/staff/{staffId}/crypto` accepts and stores attacker-controlled ML-KEM-768 public keys against any tenant on the platform without authentication. The handler logs an \"Unauthorized crypto key storage attempt\" warning when neither a session nor a registration cookie is present, then proceeds to insert the row regardless. The platform's E2E claim that \"even administrators cannot view sensitive information\" is broken: any unauthenticated network attacker can register themselves as an additional encryption recipient for any tenant's future patient appointments. A second variant of the bug suppresses the unauthorized-warning log entry. The Zod schema makes the `email` field optional. When the request body omits `email` and the request carries no registration cookie, the comparison `registrationEmail === email` becomes `undefined === undefined`, which evaluates to `true`. The handler treats the request as a legitimate registration flow, skips the warning entirely, and stores the row. Successful storage is still recorded as an `[info]` log line, but the security-relevant warning that operators are most likely to monitor or alert on is gone. The `staff_crypto` table has no unique constraint on `user_id`, so an arbitrary number of attacker rows can coexist for the same staff identifier and all return as `is_active=true`. The supplied `staffId` does not need to match any existing user or pending invite. Schema validation on `passkeyId`, `publicKey`, and `privateKeyShare` is also weak: the literal string `<placeholder-base64>` was accepted, indicating no length, format, or cryptographic-validity check beyond field presence. This weakness is independent of the auth bypass but compounds it: a poisoned directory can also be filled with malformed entries that break legitimate booking flows. The injected key is consumed by the public booking flow. After completing the unauthenticated `bootstrap-challenge` and `bootstrap-verify` ceremony as a \"patient\", the resulting `bookingAccessToken` is accepted by `GET /api/tenants/{id}/appointments/staff-public-keys`, which returns the attacker-controlled keys alongside any legitimate ones. A new appointment encrypts its tunnel key with ML-KEM to all listed recipients, so the attacker becomes a co-recipient of the encryption and can decapsulate the tunnel key with the matching secret. From there, all appointment payloads for that booking are decryptable. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue.",
      "affected": [
        {
          "vendor": "open-reception",
          "product": "appointment-booking-software",
          "versions": [
            {
              "version": "< 1.0.4",
              "status": "affected"
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}