CVE-2026-66882
CVE.org · Published
- Record status
- Published
- Identifier year (not publication year)
- 2026
- Source publication
- Source updated
- Imported by cveboard
- Source snapshot
- cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline ·
CNA source text (English)
Reflected XSS in AshAuthentication confirmation and magic link interaction forms
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms. When a strategy is configured with require_interaction? set to true, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input's value attribute without HTML escaping: lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eex interpolates the confirm parameter, and lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eex interpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled with EEx.function_from_file/3 using plain <%= %> expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim. Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2 only checks that a confirm key is present, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2 reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a <script> element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required. The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.
Scoped product and version facts
Fix information unknown; no fixed version is derived here. Missing information does not prove that no fix exists.
Exploitation unknown; this catalogue does not assess exploitation.
ash_authentication
- Vendor
- team-alembic
- Product
- ash_authentication
- Platforms
- Unknown
- Default status
unaffected- Package
- ash_authentication
- Package collection
- https://repo.hex.pm
| Version (version) | Status (status) | Version scheme (versionType) | Exclusive end (lessThan) | Inclusive end (lessThanOrEqual) | Status changes (at → status) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.8.0 | affected | semver | 4.14.2 | Unavailable | None listed |
| 5.0.0-rc.0 | affected | semver | 5.0.0-rc.13 | Unavailable | None listed |
ash_authentication
- Vendor
- team-alembic
- Product
- ash_authentication
- Platforms
- Unknown
- Default status
unaffected- Package
- team-alembic/ash_authentication
- Package collection
- https://github.com
| Version (version) | Status (status) | Version scheme (versionType) | Exclusive end (lessThan) | Inclusive end (lessThanOrEqual) | Status changes (at → status) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| fe0b4558dbe852fee5d81a460a8355577618a8c8 | affected | git | * | Unavailable |
|