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CVE-2026-75083

CVE.org · Published

Historical CVEsJSONAI instructions

Record status
Published
Identifier year (not publication year)
2026
Source publication
Source updated
Imported by cveboard
Source snapshot
cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline ·

Plain text

CNA source text (English)

Integer underflow of the radio-reported frame length causes an out-of-bounds write in the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver

The receive path of the NXP KW41Z IEEE 802.15.4 driver, kw41z_rx() in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_kw41z.c, computed the payload size as pkt_len = len - KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH in a uint8_t, where len is the frame length reported by the radio. The interrupt handler kw41z_isr() obtained that length from the RX_FRAME_LENGTH field of the ZLL IRQSTS register — a copy of the PHY header length byte of the frame received over the air — and only rejected the value zero. A reported length of one therefore underflowed to pkt_len == 255. Because the packet is allocated with NET_AF_UNSPEC on a non-Ethernet L2, net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() does not clamp the request to the interface MTU; with the default fixed-size buffer pool (CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE, CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128) the allocation succeeded as a chain of two fragments. The subsequent register-to-buffer copy loops write into the first fragment only, so 255 bytes were written into a 128-byte net_buf data block, overrunning it by up to 127 bytes into adjacent network-buffer-pool memory, and reading up to 128 bytes past the end of the radio's PKT_BUFFER_RX register array. The length field originates from an unauthenticated frame transmitted by any device within 802.15.4 radio range, and is captured by the hardware at PHY-header time — before frame filtering has completed — while the handler samples it after clearing the interrupt status, so an attacker flooding frames with a length byte of one can drive the underflow. The impact is memory corruption in the shared receive buffer pool from interrupt context, most plausibly a crash or corruption of other packets' data; the overflowing bytes are radio register contents rather than attacker-authored data, which bounds the integrity impact. The fix rejects any length below KW41Z_FCS_LENGTH and additionally verifies net_buf_tailroom() of the first fragment before the copy loops, which also covers the CONFIG_NET_L2_OPENTHREAD variant of the size computation.

Scoped product and version facts

Fix information unknown; no fixed version is derived here. Missing information does not prove that no fix exists.

Exploitation unknown; this catalogue does not assess exploitation.

zephyr

Vendor
zephyrproject
Product
zephyr
Platforms
Unknown
Default status
unaffected
Package
zephyr
Package collection
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr
zephyr · Scoped product and version facts
Version (version)Status (status)Version scheme (versionType)Exclusive end (lessThan)Inclusive end (lessThanOrEqual)Status changes (at → status)
1.8.0affectedsemver4.5.0UnavailableNone listed