CVE-2026-90001

HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Serialize the remove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes ops->hdev == NULL under the lock. Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one device reference (hid_get_device()). Two paths can release it: - device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device() -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program; - BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for its own registration. The coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs "if (!hdev) return" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same reference. The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the device is simply freed while the transport is still inside hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory. The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock. With the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal. Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy traversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal re-check return early without any put. At most one of the two paths releases each registration reference.