CVE-2026-95625
CVE.org · Published
- Record status
- Published
- Identifier year (not publication year)
- 2026
- Source publication
- Source updated
- Imported by cveboard
- Source snapshot
- cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline ·
CNA source text (English)
Tauri framework v2 missing updater signature version number validation can be exploited into forced downgrade
The Tauri updater plugin verifies update binaries using minisign signatures, but the signature covers only the raw binary bytes. The update manifest -- which contains the version number, download URL, and signature -- is fetched over TLS but is never itself signed or authenticated. Because the only anti-rollback check compares the manifest's version field against the current version, and that field is unsigned, an attacker who can serve a crafted manifest can force installation of any older signed release without possessing the developer's private key.
Scoped product and version facts
Fix information unknown; no fixed version is derived here. Missing information does not prove that no fix exists.
Exploitation unknown; this catalogue does not assess exploitation.
tauri-plugin-updater
- Vendor
- Tauri
- Product
- tauri-plugin-updater
- Platforms
- Unknown
- Default status
unaffected- Package
- tauri-plugin-updater
- Package collection
- https://crates.io/crates/tauri-plugin-updater
| Version (version) | Status (status) | Version scheme (versionType) | Exclusive end (lessThan) | Inclusive end (lessThanOrEqual) | Status changes (at → status) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0.0 | affected | semver | 2.12.0 | Unavailable | None listed |
| 2.12.0 | affected | semver | Unavailable | * | None listed |