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CVE-2026-71886

CVE.org · Publicado

Histórico de CVEsJSONInstruções para IA

Status do registro
Publicado
Ano do identificador (não é o ano de publicação)
2026
Publicação na fonte
Atualização na fonte
Importado pelo cveboard
Snapshot da fonte
cve_2026-10-24_midnight_baseline ·

Texto simples

Texto da CNA em inglês

OpenPGP certification accepted from a subkey without certification authority

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it.

Fatos de produtos e versões por escopo

Dados de correção desconhecidos; nenhuma versão corrigida é deduzida aqui. Dados ausentes não comprovam ausência de correção.

Exploração desconhecida; este catálogo não avalia exploração.

BC-JAVA

Fornecedor
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.
Produto
BC-JAVA
Plataformas
  • all
Status padrão
unaffected
Pacote
bcpg
Coleção do pacote
https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java/
BC-JAVA · Fatos de produtos e versões por escopo
Versão (version)Status (status)Esquema de versões (versionType)Fim exclusivo (lessThan)Fim inclusivo (lessThanOrEqual)Mudanças de status (at → status)
1.81affectedmaven1.86IndisponívelNenhuma listada