CVE-2026-89559

libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate() The on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM label storage area. __nd_label_validate() bounds it against the config area size, but sizeof_namespace_label() returns unsigned, so the product nslot * label_size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before the comparison. A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the loop trip count in nd_label_data_init(), whose memset() walks off the end of the config_size buffer: an out-of-bounds write. The field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace via ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA. Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound check is exact; conforming labels are unaffected. The check was safe when introduced by commit 4a826c83db4e ("libnvdimm: namespace indices: read and validate"): it multiplied by sizeof(struct nd_namespace_label), a size_t, so on a 64-bit build the product did not wrap. Commit 564e871aa66f ("libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label definitions") narrowed it to 32 bits when the label size became a runtime value read via sizeof_namespace_label().